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"Of All Professions Begging is the Best"
Some Problems in the Study of Professions
Michael Davis
My title comes from a rare version of an Irish folk song,
"The Little Beggar Man". The rest of the stanza is worth quoting
here, since it explains why begging is "the best profession":
For when a man is tired he can sit down and rest.
He can beg for his dinner, he has nothing else to do
But slip around the comer with his old rigadoo1
We can, I hope, agree that, whatever this beggar is, he is not a
member of a profession-in

the sense of "profession" relevant to

professional ethics. Begging may be his occupation, trade, or
calling. Indeed, in the most common version of the song, the line
quoted in my title is actually, "Of all the trades a-going, sure
begging is the best". One question I want to answer in this talk is
why begging cannot be his profession (in the relevant sense),
though it certainly is his trade or occupation and may even be his
calling. Another question I want to answer is why engineering is
a profession, when it is, and why its being a profession is

IA

"rigadoo" is probably a knapsack (what the beggar is rigged out in).
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important for understanding both engineering and the technology
it produces.
This talk has four parts. The fIrst explains what is wrong
with the classic ways of defIning profession, an inadequate
method. The second part offers two alternative methods, both
"philosophical", explaining why one is better than the other. The
third part works out in detail the implications of the defmition
that the second philosophical method generates. The last part
considers an objection--correct

as to the facts-that

the

preferred defmition is not ''universal'' but "culturally limited".

1.

SociologicalApproachesto Profession
"Profession" has several senses in English-and,

indeed,

in most European languages that have derived the word from
Latin. "Profession" can be a mere synonym for "occupation". It
is in this sense that begging can be "the best profession". It is
also in this sense that we may, without irony or metaphor, speak
of a "professional athlete" or "professional thief'-

provided the

person in question makes a living by the activity in question.
This broad sense of "profession" is, I think, plainly not the one
relevant professional ethics. Nor is the somewhat narrower sense
(also common in English) of honest occupation, the sense that
allows us to say: "Plumbing is a profession; prostitution is not."
Our concern is the sense of "profession" allowing us to say, for
2
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example, "Plumbing is not a profession; engineering is." Our
concern is a special kind of honest occupation, one that we can
compare to other similar occupations-law,

medicine,

architecture, journalism, and so on.
There are at least three approaches to conceptualizing
profession in this special-kind-of-honest-occupation

sense. One,

what we may call "the sociological", has its origin in the social
sciences. Its language tends to be statistical. The statement of the
conception, a defmition of sorts, does not purport to give
necessary or sufficient conditions for some occupation to be a
profession but merely what is true of "most professions", "the
most important professions", "the most developed professions",
or the like. Every sociologist concerned with professions seems
to have a list of professions that the defmition must capture. Law
and medicine are always on the list; the clergy, often; and other
occupations commonly acknowledged as professions, such as
engineering, sometimes. Begging is never on the list.1

1 For more on the enormous variety of sociological definitions, see John
Kultgen, Ethics and Professionalism (University of Pennsylvania Press:
Philadelphia, 1988), especially, pp. 60-62. See also the recent exchange
between: David Sciulli, "Continental Sociology of Professions Today:
Conceptual Contributions", Current Sociology 53 (November 2005): 915-942;
and Rolf Torstendahl, ''The Need for a Definition of 'Profession"', Current
Sociology 53 (November 2005): 947 - 951.

3
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We may distinguish three traditions in the sociology of
professions (what we may call): the economic, the political, and
the anthropological. Though individual sociologists often mix
their elements, distinguishing them as "ideal types" should help
us to think. about them more clearly, even in their less ideal (that
is, mixed) forms. What is wrong with all three ideal types, a
failure to understand how central ethics is to profession, remains
even when the types mix.
The economic tradition interprets professions as primarily
a means of controlling market forces for the benefit of the
professionals themselves, that is, as a form of monopoly, guild,
or labor union. The economic tradition has two branches:
Marxist and free market. Among recent sociologists in the
Marxist tradition, the best is still Magali Sarfatti Larson (The
Rise of Professionalism, 1977); among sociologists in the freemarket tradition, Andrew Abbott (The System of Professions,
1988) is a good example. For sociologist in the economic
tradition (whether Marxist or free market), it is the would-be
members of a profession who, by acting together under favorable
conditions, create their monopoly. Successful professions have
high income, workplace autonomy, control of who can join, and
so on; less successful professions lack some or most of these
powers (more or less). Morality, if relevant at all, is relevant
merely as a means to monopoly, a way of making a "trademark"
4
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(the profession's name) more attractive to potential employers.
The success in question may be independent of what participants
in events sought. The economic tradition loves discovering "the
invisible hand" at work, especially, attempts to serve one's own
interest that in fact serve the public interest instead. Like the
monopoly itself, signs of the profession's success may be
embedded in law but need not be. What matters for the economic
tradition are market arrangements ("economic realities"), not
(mere) law.
For the political tradition, however, law is cruciaL Often
associated with Max Weber, the political tradition interprets
profession as primarily a legal condition, a matter of (reasonably
effective) laws that set standards of (advanced) education,
require a license to practice, and impose discipline upon
practitioners through formal (governmental) structures.
"Professional ethics"-and,
standards-are,

indeed, even ordinary moral

if distinguished at all, treated as just another

form of regulation. To be a profession is to be an occupation
bureaucratized in a certain way. For the political tradition, it is
society (government) that creates professions out of occupations,
and society (the public) that benefits (whoever else may benefit
as well). The political tradition substitutes society's very visible
hands for the invisible hand of economics. The members of the
profession have little or no part in making their profession. A
5
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"Moral ideal" is not, I should add, a mere synonym for
"public service". Though the ideals I just listed are easily
understood as forms of public service, some are not. For
example, the natural sciences typically seek a shared
understanding of "nature" (different sciences focusing on
different parts of nature). They seek to make known the truth
about nature without necessarily claiming to serve anyone.
Discovering and sharing the truth about nature is nonetheless a
moral ideal if, but only if, we all (at our rational best) are
interested in knowing about nature, interested enough to praise,
support, or otherwise aid those engaged in the natural sciences,
even those studying parts of nature, such as distant galaxies,
knowing about which does us absolutely no good (or, at least, no
good beyond satisfying curiosity). That scientists do not seek to
serve us all ("the public") is consistent with their in fact serving
us all. Not the intentions of scientists but "human nature" (what
interests us at our rational best) determines whether the ideal that
scientists serve is a moral ideal and therefore whether science
can be a profession.
Perhaps I can be a morally decent person without actively
serving any moral ideal, but an occupation cannot be a profession
unless it serves one. A profession serves its chosen moral ideal
by setting (and following) appropriate standards for carrying on
its occupation, standards that go beyond what law, market,
16
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of profession and, more importantly, is unlikely to. Sociology's
way of developing defInitions, that is, abstracting from a (short)
list of clear cases a few characteristics common to most or all, is
unlikely to yield a single defInition-or,

at least, is unlikely to

yield one until sociologists agree on a list of clear cases
sufficiently long to exclude most candidate defInitions. Today,
only two professions appear on all sociological lists (law and
medicine). That is much too few to derive a widely accepted
defInition. Whatever the utility of a particular sociological
defmition for a particular line of social research, no such
defInition is likely to seem defInitive to more than a minority of
sociologists. Why sociologists continue to generate defInitions in
this way need not concern us here.3
Philosophers who recognize this diversity often try to
patch together a "consensus defInition" or a "useful defInition".
So, for example, the best selling textbook in engineering ethics
suggests that "the following fIve characteristics will be useful in
distinguishing professions from nonprofessional occupations.',4
The fIve characteristics are: 1) extensive training of an

For an attempt to explain the attractions ofthe various sociological
approaches, see Michael Burrage and Rolf TorstendaW, Professions in Theory
and History: Rethinking the Study of Professions (Sage Publications: London,
1990), especially the Introduction.
4 Charles E. Harris, Jr., Michael S. Pritchard, and Michael J. Rabins,
nd
Engineering Ethics: Concepts and Cases, 2 ed. (Wadsworth: Belmont,
California, 2000), p. 12.
3

7
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intellectual character; 2) knowledge and skills vital to the wellbeing of society: 3) a monopoly or near monopoly on the
provision of their distinctive services; 4) an unusual degree of
autonomy in the workplace; and 5) a claim to be regulated by
ethical standards.5 The sign that the five characteristics derive
from sociology is that they are hedged about with "typically",
"usually", and "often". As often happens when philosophers
derive a definition from sociology, there is no attempt to
compare what everyone knows with what the sociologists say.
For example, while lawyers do have a near monopoly on legal
work in the US, no other profession has a similar position in the
market. Even physicians must share health care with dentists,
osteopaths, podiatrists, nurses, pharmacists, midwives,
chiropractors, faith healers, and so on.
This is reason enough for philosophers to stay clear of
sociological definitions of profession-and,

perhaps, to help

sociologists do better. But, for our purposes, there is a much
stronger reason to do so. Few, if any, of these sociological
definitions would rule out an immoral profession-a

profession

of thieves, assassins, torturers, or the like. Assume, for example,
that there is enough employment for torturers to form an

5

Harris, Pritchard, and Rabins, PP, 12-13.
8
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occupation. Nothing in the economic conception of profession as
such rules out the grant to certain persons of a monopoly on
torture-with

resulting high income, workplace autonomy,

control of who can join them, and so on.6 Similarly, nothing in
the political conception as such rules out laws requiring torturers
to be educated in certain ways, to pass certain tests, to be
licensed, and to be subject to having their license revoked should
they prove incompetent, careless, or otherwise unsatisfactory.
Last, there is nothing in the anthropological conception as such
to rule out special knowledge of how to torture deftning an
occupational community, a profession of torturers. Because there
is nothing in the sociological approach as such to require
professions to be moral undertakings, there is nothing in it to rule
out a profession of torturers. Individual sociologists are, of
course, free to defme profession to exclude torturers (since none
of the usual lists of clear cases includes any profession that
routinely torturers). But sociologists are equally free to defme
professions as predominantly male-because

law, medicine, and

other professions on a typical list of clear cases are
predominantly male.

6 For a well-imagined example of such an arrangement of thieves, see Terry
Pratchett, Guards! Guards! (HarperTorch: New York, 2001). Pratchett
describes this arrangement as a "thieves' guild", though, not a profession.

9
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Sociological conceptions of profession seem to be mere
collections of characteristics rather than coherent wholes; they
also seem to be somewhat arbitrary in what they collect. So, for
example, sociologists have long equated professions with
consulting occupations (sometimes also called "free professions"
or "liberal professions"), excluding from professional status (or,
at least "full professional status") most engineers, journalists,
nurses, teachers, police, and others who work as employees in
large organizations. When doctors and lawyers themselves
recently began to be absorbed into large organizations, much
written about their "de-professionalization",

Wlli

though these

professions otherwise continued much as before. Sociologists
have no way to distinguish the accidental from the central
features of profession. That, I think, is reason enough to reject
the sociological approach, even though it continues to dominate
discussion of what professions are.

2.

Two Philosophical Approaches to Profession
The other two approaches to conceptualizing profession

are, as I said, philosophicaL They offer necessary and sufficient
conditions for an occupation to count as a profession. While a
philosophical conception may leave the status of a small number
of would-be professions unsettled, it should at least be able to

explain (in a satisfying way) why those would-be professions are
10
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neither clearly professions nor clearly not professions.
Philosophical conceptions are sensitive to counter-example in a
way sociological conceptions are not. Philosophers cannot use
the standard defense of sociologists confronted with a counterexample: "I said 'most', not 'all'."
One philosophical approach to conceptualizing profession
is (what 1 shall call) the Cartesian. It answers the question, "What
do I think a profession is?" It attempts to piece together in a
coherent way the contents of one person's mind. There may be as
many Cartesian conceptions of profession as there are people
who ask themselves what they mean by "profession". The
Cartesian approach has no procedure for mediating between one
individual's defInition and another's. That, indeed, is one reason
1 call this approach Cartesian, its tendency to be solipsistic, and a
good reason to reject it. Another reason to reject the Cartesian
approach is that it yields defmitions as indifferent to morality as
the sociological approach yields. My favorite admits the mafia to
be a profession.?

John T. Sanders, ''Honor among Thieves: Some Reflections on Codes of
Professional Ethics", Professional Ethics 2 (Fall/Winter 1993): 83-103. For
another (more plausible) example of the Cartesian approach, see Daryl Koehn,
The Ground of Professional Ethics (Routledge: London, 1994). Like Kultgen,
Michael Bayles, Professional Ethics (Wadsworth: Belmont, California, 1981),
seems to offer a sociological definition.
7
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The other philosophical approach to conceptualizing
profession is (more or less) Socratic. It answers the question,
"What do we-professionals

and philosophers---{'really')

think a

profession is?" Such a conception must be worked out through a
conversation, a typical Socratic dialogue in which Cartesian Fs
unite into a public we. A member of a profession (so called) says
what she means by "profession". Philosophers, or other members
of a profession, test the defInition with counter-examples,
consider the consequences of adopting the defInition, and
otherwise examine it in the way philosophers typically do. Any
problem so discovered should be fIxed by revising the defInition
in a way that seems to resolve the problem. The defInition is
again examined. And so the process continues until the defInition
satisfIes everyone participating in the conversation. This critical
conversation underwrites the claim that the resulting defInition is
''what we really think a profession is" (that is, what we think it is
after enough reflection).
The conversation need not end with a defInition that
includes all groups originally called "profession". The
conversation may lead some participants to withdraw their claim
to belong to a profession. There is nothing canonical about the
original list of professions. The Socratic approach nonetheless
provides a procedure for resolving disputes, something neither
the sociological nor the Cartesian does. Individual insights must
12
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be incorporated into a single definition on which everyone
agrees. The Socratic procedure concludes only when there is no
live alternative to its preferred deftnition, a procedure that
necessarily excludes individual mistakes and even widespread
but indefensible prejudices. In this respect, the resulting
deftnition is a product of reason rather than individual or social
psychology.
After many years of applying this method, I have
reached the following deftnition:
A profession is a number of individuals in the same
occupation voluntarily organized to earn a living by
openly serving a moral ideal in a morally-permissible
way beyond what law, market, morality, and public
opinion would otherwise require.
3.

Understanding the Socratic Definition
According to this Socratic defInition, a profession is a

group undertaking. There can be no profession with just one
member. This is one respect in which members of a profession
differ from mere experts, artists, or other knowledgeable, skillful,
or inventive people. Such people can be one of a kind, working
alone. A professional never works alone.
The group forming a profession must share an occupation
(though its members may be only a subset of the occupation
rather than the whole). Whether the occupants of a certain
13
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collection of job descriptions constitutes one occupation, two, or
several is, of course, as much a matter of decision as of factmuch as is the amount of hair one must have on his head to
defend against a charge of baldness. To decide whether a certain
collection of jobs is one or more than one occupation, we must
know how similar the skills in question, how much movement
between jobs of different descriptions, how similar the work of
occupants of different jobs, how different from neighboring
occupations the (candidate) "occupation" in question, and so on.
There is usually room for argument-and,

often, room even for

more than one good answer. For example, for the purpose, say,
of membership in the Institute for Electrical and Electronic
Engineers (IEEE), computer scientists may count as belonging to
the same occupation as electrical engineers. But, for some other
purpose, say, the study of engineering ethics, computer scientists
may be too different (since they have their own code of ethics).
Though occupations do have fuzzy boundaries, they defInitely
have boundaries. Law and medicine cannot be one profession;
nor can engineering and journalism. The underlying disciplines
are just too different.
According to the Socratic defmition, the group in
question (the would-be profession) must organize to work in a
morally permissible way. If there is no morally permissible way
to carry on the occupation, it cannot be a profession. There can,
14
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for example, be no profession of thieves, assassins, or torturers
(since theft, murder, and torture are-almost

always-morally

wrong). Morality thus limits what can be a profession. Some
professions ("professional thief', "professional assassin",
"professional torturer") are conceptually impossible.
The moral permissibility of a profession's occupation is
one way that, according to the Socratic definition, profession is
conceptually connected with morality. There are two others. One
concerns "moral ideals". A moral ideal is a state of affairs
"everyone" (every rational person at her rational best) recognizes
as a significant good. (That the state of affairs in question is a
good is shown by her wanting it-at

her rational best-to

exist;

the significance of that good is shown by her being willing to
help, in at least minor ways, to realize it.) For most professions,
stating the distinctive moral ideal (roughly) is easy: physicians
have organized to cure the sick, comfort the dying, and protect
the healthy from disease; lawyers, to help people obtain justice
within the law; and so on. Health, a comfortable death, justice
within the law, and the like are goods we all recognize as
significant. One reason the little beggar man can't belong to a
profession is that his conception of begging lacks a moral ideal to
serve; his reasons for thinking begging ''best'' all concern his
comfort or convenience.
15
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"Moral ideal" is not, I should add, a mere synonym for
"public service". Though the ideals I just listed are easily
understood as forms of public service, some are not. For
example, the natural sciences typically seek a shared
understanding of "nature" (different sciences focusing on
different parts of nature). They seek to make known the truth
about nature without necessarily claiming to serve anyone.
Discovering and sharing the truth about nature is nonetheless a
moral ideal if, but only if, we all (at our rational best) are
interested in knowing about nature, interested enough to praise,
support, or otherwise aid those engaged in the natural sciences,
even those studying parts of nature, such as distant galaxies,
knowing about which does us absolutely no good (or, at least, no
good beyond satisfying curiosity). That scientists do not seek to
serve us all ("the public") is consistent with their in fact serving
us alL Not the intentions of scientists but "human nature" (what
interests us at our rational best) determines whether the ideal that
scientists serve is a moral ideal and therefore whether science
can be a profession.
Perhaps I can be a morally decent person without actively
serving any moral ideal, but an occupation cannot be a profession
unless it serves one. A profession serves its chosen moral ideal
by setting (and following) appropriate standards for carrying on
its occupation, standards that go beyond what law, market,
16
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morality, and public opinion would otherwise require.8 At least
one of those standards must be special, that is, something not
imposed by law, market, (ordinary) morality, or public opinion.
Otherwise the occupation (the candidate profession) would
remain nothing more than an honest way to earn a living. So, for
example, what distinguish the professional soldier from the mere
mercenary (however expert and honest) are the special standards
of a professional soldier. To be a (good) mercenary, one need
only competently carry out the terms of one's (morally
permissible) contract of employment, but to be a (good)
professional soldier, one must do more, for example, serve one's
country honorably even when the contract of employment,
statute, ordinary morality, and public opinion do not require it.
The third way that professions are connected with
morality (only implicit in the defInition) is that their special
standards are morally binding on every member of the profession
simply because of that membership. These binding standards (the
profession's "ethics") are what constitute the profession's
essential organization, not its learned societies or regulatory
agencies. But how is it possible for standards that are morally

There is no need for the moral ideal to be unique. Several professions may
share the same moral ideal. So, for example, osteopaths (O.D.'s) seem to have
the same moral ideal as physicians (M.D.'s). What distinguish osteopaths from
physicians are their special standards, especially their educational standards
and standards of practice.
8
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permissible but not otherwise part of ordinary morality to be
morally binding on members of a profession? That, I think, is the
central question in the philosophy of professions. Here is my
answer.
Professions must be "professed" (that is, declared or
claimed). Physicians must declare themselves to be physicians;
lawyers must claim to be lawyers; engineers must say they are
engineers; and so on. They need not advertise or otherwise
publicly announce their profession. There is nothing conceptually
impossible about a secret profession, for example, a profession of
spies (assuming what they do is morally permissible). But even
members of a profession of spies would have to declare their
profession to potential clients or employers. Professionals must
declare their profession in order to earn a living by it. They
cannot be hired as such-and-such-say,

a chemical engineer-

unless potential employers know that they are "chemical
engineers" (in the special-standards sense). They cannot, that is,
be hired as a chemical engineer if they only claim to know a lot
about chemical plants, to have earned a living by designing,
managing, or overseeing the maintenance of certain chemical
plants for several years, and to be good at it. If chemical
engineers have a good reputation for what they do, the (truthful)

18
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declaration of membership in that profession ("I am a chemical
engineer") will aid them in earning a living as a chemical
engineer. They will fmd appropriate employment. If, however,
their profession has a bad reputation (or none), a declaration of
membership will be a disadvantage (or, at least, no help).
Compare, for example, your response to the declaration, "I am a
chemical engineer", with your response to "I am an alchemist").
Where members of a profession freely declare their
membership, the profession's way of pursuing its moral ideal
will be a voluntary, morally-permissible cooperative practice.
The members of the profession will be members because they
were entitled to be, wished to be, and spoke up accordingly (that
is, were open about their profession). They may cease to be
members simply by ceasing to claim membership.
In general, members of an occupation free to declare
membership in the corresponding profession will declare it only
if the declaration seems likely to benefit them (that is, serve at
least one purpose of their own at what seems a reasonable cost).
The purpose need not be self-interested, though it often is; there
is nothing to prevent some, or even all, members of a profession
entering it, for example, simply to be in a good position to help
others in a certain way. Ifhired (in part) because they declared
their membership, members of a profession will be in position to
have the benefits of the profession, employment as a member,
19
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because the employer sought such-and-such and they (truthfully)
declared themselves to be one. They will also be in position to
take advantage of the practice by doing less than the standards of
the practice require, even though the expectation (justified by
their declaration of profession) was that they would do what the
profession's standards require.9 If cheating consists in violating
the rules of a voluntary, morally permissible cooperative
practice, then every member of a profession is-because
membership-in

of that

a position to cheat. Since, all else equal,

cheating is morally wrong, every member of a profession has a
moral obligation, all else equal, to do as the special standards of
the profession require. The professional standards are morally
binding much as a promise is.
An occupation "professionalizes" by organizing as a
profession, that is, by adopting special standards; it "deprofessionalizes" (ceases to be a profession) by abandoning such
standards. "Professionalism" is (strictly speaking) simply acting
as the standards of the (relevant) profession require. To be a
"professional" (or "a real pro") is to be a member (in good
standing) of the profession in question-or

(by analogy) to act as

They are, of course, in position to take advantage of the professional practice
in large part at least, precisely because law, morality, market, and public
opinion do not enforce those standards (or at least enforce them effectively
enough to make following the standards prudent without the additional moral
obligation arising from profession).
20
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if one were (that is, to act in the way the relevant standards
require or, perhaps, should require). Professional standards are,
of course, open to interpretation. Part of being a professional is
interpreting the relevant standards in ways the profession
recognizes as legitimate, for example, interpreting a certain
technical standard taking into account the moral ideal it was
designed to serve. Conduct is ''unprofessional'' if it is
inconsistent with the profession's standards (properly
interpreted). Since only members of a profession are subject to
the profession's standards, only they can violate them. Someone
not a member of the profession can be a charlatan, mountebank,
or impostor, but cannot engage in unprofessional conduct.
Professional standards may, and generally do, vary from
profession to profession. There is no reason why the professional
standards of engineers should be the same as those of lawyersor even architects. A profession's standards depend, at least in
part, on opinion within the profession and therefore change from
time to time as opinion changes. A profession's standards
generally appear in a range of documents, including admission
requirements, rules of practice, and disciplinary procedures. A
profession is organized (successfully) insofar as its special

21
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standards are realized in the practice of its members, in what they
do and how they evaluate themselves and one another.
This elucidation of the Socratic deftnition is also a
"proof' of it (insofar as a deftnition can be proved). Insofar you
found the description of profession it generates unsurprising even
when, as it often does, it deviates from this or that sociological
deftnition (for example, by not requiring professions to be
licensed or have a monopoly), you are recognizing it as a good
defmition of profession (a practice with which we are all
familiar). And, insofar as the defmition seems to help explain
how ethics (special moral standards) is a necessary part of
profession, it identiftes itself as a deftnition peculiarly relevant to
the study of professional ethics. And, insofar as other defmitions
fail one or both these tests (as all seem to), this defmition must
be "the" defmition of profession.

4.

An Objection Considered: Code of Ethics?
We turn now to one important objection to the analysis

provided so far. One of the documents stating professional
standards may be (what is often called) "a code of ethics", a
formal statement of the most general rules of practice. Yet, while
many defmitions of profession require such a code as a condition
of being a profession, the Socratic defmition does not. That
omission is both important in itself and as further proof of the
22
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defInition. While a formal code of ethics is a central feature of
professions in the United States, Canada, Britain, and most other
English-speaking countries and has been since early in the
twentieth century, few such codes seem to have existed outside
English-speaking countries until after the Second World War. I
say "almost" because there certainly seem to have been some, for
example, the code that the Japanese Society of Civil Engineers
adopted in 1938 ("Beliefs and Principles of Practice for Civil
Engineers"). Perhaps, if we looked, we would fmd many more
such examples.
The use of the word "profession" in anything like the
special-kind-of-honest-occupation

sense discussed here also

seems to have begun in English-speaking countries only in the
last hundred years or so and to have spread elsewhere only in the
last fIfty. There is, Ithink, little reason to doubt that "profession"
(in the sense discussed here) is an English invention much as the
railroad engine and parliamentary democracy are-and,

like the

railroad engine and parliamentary democracy, has spread to
much of the rest of the world. Every new thing must begin
somewhere.
Yet some non-English-speaking

countries without a

(formal) code of professional ethics (or their own word for
profession in our preferred sense) seem to have entities otherwise
much like professions in English-speaking countries. So,
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requiring aformal code or requiring it to apply to something
called a "profession" seems unnecessarily Anglo-centric-as
well as settling by defmition what would otherwise be an
interesting empirical question (whether a certain occupation in
this or that country is a profession even though it lacks a formal
code of ethics). It is therefore evidence for the Socratic defmition
offered here that it does not require a profession to have a formal
code of ethics (or to be called "a profession") but instead
instructs us how to determine by empirical research whether a
particular occupation is organized in a certain way. What it tells
us to look for is the triple connection between occupation and
morality just described. It is this complex connection that
distinguishes profession from otherwise similar forms of social
organization, such as labor unions, learned societies, and licensed
trades.
In many countries lacking formal codes of professional
ethics, perhaps in all, technical standards incorporate the same
requirements a code of ethics would in England, Australia, or the
United States, though implicit in details rather than explicit in the
more general terms characteristic of a code of ethics. In those
countries, the code of ethics may, in this sense, be both in writing
(in technical standards) and still ''unwritten'' (that is, not
formalized as a "code of ethics"). Whether the technical
standards of physicians, lawyers, or engineers in any country in
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fact serve as an implicit code of ethics depends on the attitude
that the members of the relevant occupation in the country in
question (or at least most of them) generally take toward those
standards (assuming the standards to be morally permissible and
designed to serve a certain moral ideal). If, for example,
engineers in Turkey regard their technical standards as
(primarily) external impositions, the standards count as law, not
as an (implicit) code of ethics (whatever their content). If,
however, each Turkish engineer (or, at least, most of them)
regard their technical standards as rules they want every other
Turkish engineer to follow even if that would mean having to do
the same, that is, as part of a cooperative practice, then (all else
equal) the standards do constitute a code of ethics (even if an
unusually detailed one and even if enacted into law}--and
Turkey has a profession of engineering.
I have informally carried on such empirical research for
more than a decade, mostly by asking questions of engineers or
professors of engineering I meet either when they are traveling in
the US or I am traveling abroad. I now have the impression that
some countries have an engineering profession indistinguishable
from the American even though they do not have a code of ethics
or a term for profession not borrowed from English. Dutch
engineers are my best example---or at least were until the Royal
Institution of Engineers adopted a code of ethics. I also have the
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impression that a few countries may lack an engineering
profession altogether. Interestingly, the clearest example of that
is not some underdeveloped country in Africa, Asia, or Latin
America, but one of the most advanced countries of Western
Europe, the birthplace of engineering. French engineers I
questioned seemed to understand themselves as government
agents (even if working for a private employer). They served
"the state", not some independent moral ideal. They understood
themselves as bound by law and morality but not by a code of
professional ethics (as I have interpreted that term). Indeed, they
initially understood ''profession'' to be a synonym for
"occupation" and had great trouble understanding what I meant
by "professional ethics". They initially thought I meant the
application to engineering of moral theories-what

philosophers

teach in a course called "Ethics". If my impression of French
engineers is accurate, then professional ethics is still "culturally
relative", not-like

engineering or physics-more

or less

universal.
Understanding an occupation as a profession has many
consequences both for teaching and for research. So, for
example, if engineering in a particular society is a profession, all
engineers (and only engineers) in that society belong to one
community, engineering. Whether they belong as well to other
communities-a

province, company, industry, or occupational
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category ("technologists"), they will have distinctive ways of
working simply because they are engineers. To understand
engineers as engineers, we must study their profession (as well as
their function, discipline, and occupation). Ifwe are to teach
engineering ethics in such a society, we must take into account
not only the substance of their code of ethics (whether explicit or
implicit) but also the special reason a professional has to obey it
("Don't cheat"). The same is true for any other profession.
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